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SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IS IT
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Hey Stubby! Stop looking at your microscopic penis. It
won't help it grow. Get back to work!" If such a statement
were made in the workplace by one male to another, could or
should such a statement be the impetus for a sexual harass-
ment charge under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?1
After recent court decisions,2 it is unclear whether same-
gender sexual harassment 3 would be actionable as a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII.4 Most people would agree
that the above comment is rude and inappropriate workplace
behavior. But, should victims of such harassment be allowed
to file a federal discrimination claim against their employer?
Although sexual harassment between males and females
has gained significant attention in recent years by both the
public and the legal profession, same-gender sexual harass-
ment is still not widely acknowledged. 5 In many federal
courts, same-gender sexual harassment is not actionable as
discrimination under Title VII.6
It has, in fact, been less than a decade since sexual har-
assment was formally recognized and accepted as a form of
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
2. See infra parts II.C-D, TV.
3. Same-gender sexual harassment also includes harassment between two
females. However, because of the limited case law involving sexual harassment
between females, this comment focuses mainly on harassment between males.
See Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1377 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995); Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc., 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1886 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 1995); Marrero-Rivera v. De-
partment of Justice, 800 F. Supp. 1024 (D.P.R. 1992), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1089 (1st
Cir. 1994). The analysis and proposal remain the same whether the harass-
ment is between men or women.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
5. See discussion infra parts II.C-D, IV.C-D.
6. See Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994);
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wa-
bash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F.
Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
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sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII.7 The United
States Supreme Court first recognized that sexual harass-
ment was actionable under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson.8
Prior to its inclusion as a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII, sexual harassment was not widely accepted
as an injurious cause of action.9 The judiciary's recognition of
the unique position of females in the workplace, however, has
redefined the cultural meanings of interactions between
males and females. '0
In other sexual discrimination suits not involving a claim
of harassment, it is accepted that men complain of gender-
based injuries." However, a majority of sexual harassment
plaintiffs are women, 12 and their complaints rarely have a
"precise analogue in the experience of men."13
In 1992, nine percent' 4 of the sexual harassment claims
reported to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) were filed by men.' 5 The previous year, only seven
percent of the sexual harassment claims were by men.16 In
1982, a United States Merit System Protection Board study
also found that fifteen percent of men reported having been
sexually harassed at work within the preceding twenty-four
months.' 7 However, neither the EEOC nor the Merit System
Protection Board distinguished whether the complaints arose
from situations where the man was harassed by another man
or by a woman.1 8
7. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
8. Id. Meritor is the only time the Supreme Court has ruled on the same-
gender sexual harassment issue. Id. However, with the conflicting lower court
standards on same-gender sexual harassment, the Supreme Court should rec-
ognize a need for uniformity and grant certiorari to a Title VII same-gender
sexual harassment case. See infra parts II.C-D, IV.C-D.
9. Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the
Literature, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1993).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 38.
12. Id. at 38 n.3.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 38 n.3. Men filed 968 of the 10,577 total complaints. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sandra S. Tangri et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explana-
tory Models, 38 J. Soc. ISSUEs 33, 42-43 (1982).
18. Id.; see also Chamallas, supra note 9, at 38 n.3.
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Originally, federal courts were unwilling to recognize
any sexual harassment actions brought under Title VII by
males.'" As sexual harassment became an established cause
of action, primarily through the work of the feminist move-
ment,20 federal courts became more receptive to sexual har-
assment cases involving males.2 Title VII was found to pro-
tect both males and females.22 However, courts refused to
allow homosexual harassment claims, because harassment
based on an individual's sexual orientation is not covered
under Title VII.23
Even though some courts have stated that Title VII pro-
tection is also available to males,24 no cases have been de-
cided in favor of a sexual harassment claim where the alleged
sexual harassment was perpetrated solely by a heterosexual
male against another heterosexual male.25 Many of the
same-gender sexual harassment cases have involved homo-
sexual or perceived homosexual conduct.26 In such cases, the
19. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IMI. 1988) (disallowing
claims for sexual harassment of a male because the plaintiff was employed in a
predominantly male environment and males are not members of a protected
class).
20. See CATHERINE A. McKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
21. See, e.g., Hensen v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982);
Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, 984 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1993); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala.
1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. IMI. 1981).
22. Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, 984
F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993).
23. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan.
15, 1992); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); De Cintio v. Westchester County Medical
Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017
(1985); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. See, e.g., Hensen v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982);
Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, 984 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1993); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala.
1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 307 (N.D. 111. 1981).
25. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993);
Goluszek v. Smith, 897 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988).
26. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992) (complaining of graffiti on conveyor belts and loading trucks that said,
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harassment by a homosexual was actionable, whereas if the
victim of the harassment was a homosexual, it was not pro-
tected under Title VII.
27
Early development of sexual harassment law seemed to
favor allowing claims by males against other males.2" These
early decisions allowed same-gender claims under Title VII
but lacked extensive discussion of Title VII and its original
purpose.29 Title VII's original purpose was to prevent dis-
crimination of certain groups of people in the workplace.30
Same-gender sexual harassment was not contemplated by
Congress.3 '
However, the recent decisions of Garcia v. Elf Atochem
North America,32 Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp.,33
"Dillon gives head"); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822,
824 (D. Md. 1994) (kissing on cheek and comments including "Ah, alone at
last"), aff'd, 70 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Hannah
v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325,
1326 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991) (touching and kissing); Parrish v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 19, 1990) (brushing sensations on thighs); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp.,
597 F. Supp. 537, 538 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (touching in the groin area), aff'd with-
out opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (complaining of homosexual
advances).
27. Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); De Cintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr.,
807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); DeSantis v. Pa-
cific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala.
1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. 111. 1981). As late as 1990,
Joyner and Wright were cited as the only two prior reported cases dealing with
same-gender sexual harassment in the form of homosexual advances. Parrish
v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at
*8-*9 n.2. (N.D. 111. Oct. 19, 1990). In Parrish, the court suggested that "unwel-
come homosexual advances are actionable under Title VII." Id.
29. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597
F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th
Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
30. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
31. See infra part II.A.
32. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
33. 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178
(N.D. Ind. 1995).
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and Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.3 4 summarily
concluded that same-gender sexual harassment is not a form
of sex discrimination and is not protected by Title VII. 35 The
decisions by these three courts contain persuasive authority
for other federal courts faced with Title VII sexual harass-
ment cases filed by parties of the same gender.36
This comment first traces the development of Title VII
sexual harassment case law as it applies to same-gender sex-
ual harassment, and examines the judicial reasoning of the
courts in Garcia,37 Vandeventer,38 and Hopkins.39 This com-
ment then compares these cases to the reasoning of other fed-
eral court decisions which allowed Title VII same-gender har-
assment claims under limited circumstances. 40 Disparate
judicial treatment of same-gender sexual harassment is also
analyzed and compared with the intent and purpose behind
sexual harassment law and Title VII. 41 It is argued that
same-gender sexual harassment does not have the same ef-
fects, nor does it further the goals of Title VII to empower the
powerless and eliminate discrimination based on sex.42
Finally, this comment proposes that federal courts
should follow the precedent set by Garcia, Vandeventer, and
Hopkins.43 Title VII should not be applicable to same-gender
sexual harassment, regardless of the sexual orientation of the
parties. Rather, same-gender sexual harassment can be bet-
ter handled and compensated using other judicial remedies.
An alternative and more expedient remedy available to vic-
tims of same-gender sexual harassment is a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.44
34. 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996).
35. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451; Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834; Vandeventer, 867
F. Supp. at 796.
36. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451; Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834; Vandeventer, 867
F. Supp. at 796.
37. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
38. Vandeventer v. Wabash Natl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994),
reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
39. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
aff'd, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996).
40. See discussion infra part II.C.
41. See discussion infra part II.A.
42. See infra part IV.A.
43. See infra part V.
44. See infra part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer "to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to ... compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin. " 5 Title VII, by its terms, prohibits only sex discrimina-
tion, not sexual harassment. 46 However, according to the
United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination
under Title VII.4 7 Consequently, sexual harassment law was
judicially created.
In order to better understand the implications of the dis-
parate treatment of same-gender sexual harassment by vari-
ous courts, the principles behind Title VII and the recognition
of sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination must
be examined and applied to same-gender harassment cases.
A. The Purpose of Sexual Harassment Law and Legislative
Intent of Title VII
1. Legislative Intent of Title VII
The legislative history of Title VII does not indicate an
intent to include sexual harassment.4" In fact, "sex" was a
last minute addition to the legislation with little debate on
the subject.49 The amendment was added by an opponent of
the Civil Rights Act who intended to forestall the entire bill.50
The only debate on the amendment was an argument against
it, that sex discrimination was different than other kinds of
discrimination and should have its own separate
legislation.51
The Supreme Court recognizes that the doctrinal basis
for classifying sexual harassment as sexual discrimination is
to prevent and prohibit disparate treatment of employees be-
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
46. Id.
47. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
48. Id. at 63-64.
49. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Following the passage of the Act, a judge
commented that the amendment was intended as a "joke." Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
50. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
51. Id.
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cause of their sex. 52 The Supreme Court has stated that the
goal of Title VII is to provide equal employment opportunity
for all members of society, regardless of their race, sex, na-
tional origin, etc.53 That goal is accomplished in part by im-
posing an affirmative duty on employers to maintain a work-
ing environment free of discriminatory intimidation such as
sexual harassment.54 Judge Bork noted in Vinson that "Title
VII was passed to outlaw discriminatory behavior and not
simply behavior of which we strongly disapprove."55
2. The Power Principle: What Is It?
Sexual harassment is often defined as "the exploitation of
a powerful position to impose the sexual demands or pres-
sures on an unwilling but less powerful person."56 The abuse
of that power, in the form of sexual harassment, discrimi-
nates against members of a "discrete and vulnerable group,"
and it violates the civil rights of the victims.5 7 From this per-
spective, sexual harassment stems from the imbalance of
power between men and women in society,58 and it is ampli-
fied when the relationship between the male and female be-
comes that of an employer and employee.5 9
3. The Idea of Sexual Harassment as a Group Injury
The idea of "group injury" is derived from the perception
that "women suffer because they are women, regardless of
their unique qualities, and that men perpetrate [the suffer-
ing] because they enjoy economic power over women."60 An
apt analogy for this dynamic is that "[e]conomic power is to
sexual harassment as physical force is to rape."6 ' The pres-
52. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978).
53. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982).
54. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
55. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815
(1985), aff'd sub. nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
56. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under
Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984).
57. Id.
58. See BARBARA BABCOCK ET AL., SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 195-99 (1975).
59. See Note, supra note 56, at 1452.
60. Ellen Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Par-
adigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 347 (1990).
61. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 217-18.
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ence or absence of a particular group's power in society quali-
fies sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. It log-
ically follows that harassment based on sex is a "group
injury. )62
B. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
1. General Theories
Sexual harassment case law recognizes two theories
under which sexual harassment may be claimed.63 The first,
quid pro quo64 harassment, is the more familiar type of har-
assment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a
term of employment, or continued employment, is condi-
tioned upon acceptance of unwelcome sexual advances.66
Harassment of this type includes "sexual propositions, un-
warranted graphic discussion of sexual acts, comments on the
employee's body and the sexual uses to which it could be
put."
66
Because quid pro quo harassment is universally accepted
as egregious and results in discrimination for both sexes,
67
this comment focuses primarily on the second class of sexual
harassment actions, those charging discrimination based on a
hostile or abusive work environment.68
According to case law69 and EEOC Guidelines, 70 an em-
ployer can be held liable for fostering hostile work environ-
62. Paul, supra note 60, at 347.
63. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
64. Id. at 67; EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1995).
65. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
66. Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 118 (Ct. App. 1993);
see also Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 620, 624 (Ct. App. 1986), review granted and opinion superseded, 730 P.2d
805 (Cal. 1987), dismissed and remanded, 805 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1991).
67. See B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment
Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993); Paul, supra note 60, at 336-38; see also
infra part II.C.
68. See infra part II.B.
69. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992); see, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Highlander v. KF.C. Natl Management Co., 805 F.2d
644, 649 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th
Cir. 1982).
70. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1995).
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ment sexual harassment if the following criteria are met: (1)
the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff
is subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature; (3) the harassment complained of is based on sex;
(4) the harassment alleged had the effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment
that affected seriously the psychological well-being of the
plaintiff; and (5) there is respondeat superior liability.7
By recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment
claims, courts acknowledged that "employees have a right to
a work environment free from denigrating comments, verbal
abuse and other tactics of marginalization."72 However, this
right is not absolute, and courts, through their interpretation
of Meritor and close scrutiny of factual situations, have lim-
ited the scope of such claims.73 The question remains
whether the courts will limit the use of hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment claims to those between males and
females or those involving claims against homosexuals, or
whether the courts will expand their holdings to include all
same-gender sexual harassment.
2. What Type of Behavior Creates a Hostile Work
Environment?
In Meritor, the Supreme Court equated hostile sexual
work environments to those of hostile racial environments,74
stating that "nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile envi-
ronment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should
not be likewise prohibited."75 The Court established that,
where a hostile work environment is created because of com-
ments or conduct motivated strictly by a person's gender, the
71. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992); see, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Highlander v. KF.C. Natl Management Co., 805 F.2d
644, 649 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th
Cir. 1982).
72. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332, at 70,106 (6th Cir.
Jan. 15, 1992); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
73. Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 70,106-07. Title VII punishes only
those who deny their workers an environment free of abuse on the basis of cer-
tain attributes such as gender and race. Id.
74. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
75. Id.
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actions are discriminatory and illegal.7 6 The Court concluded
that Title VII is violated by a hostile work environment cre-
ated by "discrimination based on sex."77
Since Meritor, courts have grappled with defining what
kind of conduct was "based on sex."78 The Eleventh Circuit,
in Henson v. City of Dundee,79 stated that "in proving a claim
for hostile work environment due to sexual harassment...
the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she
would not have been the object of harassment."8 0
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits recognize that "sex" as
used in Title VII means "gender."' Therefore, courts consist-
ently have held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual preference or orientation. 2 Conse-
quently, a male who was harassed by a supervisor who
believed him to be a homosexual was not protected under Ti-
tle VII.83 The motivation for this harassment was the vic-
tim's sexual orientation, not his gender.8 4
3. Heterosexual Male Claims of Sexual Harassment
For a heterosexual male to state a claim for sexual har-
assment, he must prove that the harassment was directed to-
ward him because he was a male.8 5 The harassing conduct
need not be sexual in nature.8 6 Rather, it must have occurred
because of the man's gender.87
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1017 (1985); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977).
82. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089; DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992).
84. Id.
85. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-
23 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
86. Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 70,108. The content of the harass-
ing words is not the deciding factor in determining Title VII applicability.
Rather, the inquiry is whether the harassment was motivated by the victim's
sex. Id.
87. Id.
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Deciding whether hostile conduct was directed toward
someone because of his or her sex may seem a relatively easy
standard. However, courts throughout the country find the
standard difficult to apply, especially in situations involving
conduct between males.8 8
There are two conflicting judicial interpretations regard-
ing same-gender sexual harassment. One interpretation is
that, by its nature, same-gender sexual harassment is not
"based on sex" and is not actionable under Title VII.8 9 The
other interpretation, however, looks at the facts of each har-
assment situation to determine whether the same-gender
sexual harassment was based on sex.90 Invariably, under the
latter view, if the harasser was a homosexual, then the har-
assment of a heterosexual was based on sex and was actiona-
ble under Title VII. However, if the victim was a homosex-
ual, it was motivated by the victim's sexual orientation and
was not actionable under Title VII 9 1
88. See, e.g., Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994);
Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 70,104-08; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F.
Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir.
Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Natl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind.
1994), reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Hannah v. Philadel-
phia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1326 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 1991); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp.,
597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
89. Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822,834-35 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd,
70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Natl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887
F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1326 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D.
111. Oct. 19, 1990); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without
opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
90. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993);
Parrish v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537
(M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
91. See discussion infra parts II.B-D, IV.C.
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C. Development of Case Law Allowing Same-Gender
Sexual Harassment in Limited Circumstances
Most courts have expanded Title VII's application beyond
harassment of a female by a male.92 Many cases involving
harassment exclusively between men have involved the more
common form of sexual harassment, quid pro quo, where
work conditions are dependent on acquiescence to sexual de-
mands.93 Only a select few involve the less pervasive claim of
hostile work environment.94
Title VII's recognition of hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment cases between males is important to the de-
velopment of sexual harassment law. Such cases provide
support for the assertion that Title VII is intended to apply to
claims of sexual harassment "based on sex," without regard
to the gender of the complainant or the harassing party.95
1. Parrish v. Washington International Insurance Co.
In Parrish v. Washington International Insurance Co.,96
the plaintiff alleged that physical contact between himself
and his male supervisor constituted sexual harassment
under Title VII.9 v The complaint alleged a few isolated inci-
dents of brushing sensations on the plaintiff's thighs while he
was working with his supervisor. 98 The court found that this
was not actionable conduct because it was not sufficiently
pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment. 99
92. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902-03 (11th Cir.
1982); Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, 984
F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542
(M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
93. See discussion supra part II.A. Quid pro quo harassment involves ac-
quiescing to sexual behavior in order to meet a term or condition of employ-
ment. Logically, such conduct is not and cannot be allowed under Title VII. See
supra parts 1V-V.
94. Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D. Tex.
1993); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *1 (N.D. 111. Oct. 19, 1990); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
95. Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D. Tex.
1993).
96. No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990).
97. Parrish, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *1.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *3-*6.
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In Parrish, the court stated, in dicta, that "unwelcome
homosexual advances, like unwelcome heterosexual ad-
vances, are actionable under Title VII." 100 The Parrish court
reasoned that:
[i]f plaintiff complains of unwelcome homosexual ad-
vances, the offending conduct is based on the employer's
sexual preference and necessarily involved the plaintiff's
gender, for an employee of the non-preferred gender
would not inspire the same treatment. Thus, unwelcome
homosexual advances, like unwelcome heterosexual ad-
vances are actionable under Title VII.1 °1
The court in Parrish found only two prior cases that dealt
with unwanted homosexual advances: Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transportation10 2 and Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,
Inc. 103 In both cases, the courts found that homosexual ad-
vances were actionable under Title VII as discrimination
based on sex.'1 4
Parrish, Joyner, and Wright illustrate the judicial inter-
pretation that same-gender sexual harassment is prohibited
by Title VII, but only if the harassment is by a homosexual or
perceived homosexual. 10 5 It is unclear from this line of cases
whether sexual harassment between two heterosexual males
is prohibited under Title VII.
2. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp. and the
Bisexual/Equal Opportunity Harasser
Parrish, Joyner, and Wright involved harassing conduct
that was perceived as homosexual advances. 10 6 Chiapuzio v.
BLT Operating Corp. °7 did not involve homosexual conduct.
Rather, it concerned comments directed toward one hetero-
sexual male by another heterosexual male, regarding the for-
100. Id. at *9 n.2.
101. Id. at *9.
102. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1984).
103. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. IM. 1981).
104. Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 542; Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
105. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *9 (N.D. IlM. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 541;
Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
106. Parrish, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *1; Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at
541; Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
107. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
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mer's lovemaking abilities with his wife.108 This case was
also unique in that the heterosexual male's complaint was
filed in conjunction with that of his wife for the same sexually
harassing conduct.10 9
In Chiapuzio, a married couple was subjected to continu-
ous sexually abusive remarks by their supervisor. 011 Most of
the remarks involved the supervisor's bragging about his su-
perior sexual prowess, and the inadequacies of the married
man in fulfilling his wife's sexual needs."' Another plaintiff,
a heterosexual male, was also subjected to similar remarks
about his substandard libido." 2
The defendants argued that if the supervisor harassed
both male and female employees, he could not be found to
have discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their gen-
der. 113 The court found this argument flawed for several rea-
sons, 1 14 and it labeled the supervisor an "equal opportunity
harasser" who was not insulated from liability under Title
VII.115
The "equal opportunity harasser," also referred to as the
"bisexual harasser," was first recognized by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in a dissent by Judge Bork in Vinson v. Tay-
lor. 116 There, a "bisexual harasser" was defined as a supervi-
sor who "makes unwanted sexual overtures to both men and
women employees."" 7 In his dissent to the court's denial of a
rehearing en banc, Judge Bork stated:
Had congress been aiming at sexual harassment [in en-
acting Title VII], it seems unlikely that a woman would be
protected from unwelcome heterosexual or lesbian ad-
108. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1334. The sexual orientation of the parties
is not discussed in the case, but the assumption is that both males were hetero-
sexual. Id.
109. Id. at 1335.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1335-36.
112. Id. at 1335.
113. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1337-38.
116. 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub
nom. PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), aff'd sub. nom. Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
117. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Vinson
v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), aff'd sub.
non. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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vances but left unprotected when a bisexual attacks. That
bizarre result suggests that Congress was not thinking of
individual harassment at all [when it enacted Title VII]
but of discrimination in conditions of employment be-
cause of gender. If it is proper to classify harassment as
discrimination for Title VII purposes, that decision at
least demands adjustments in subsidiary doctrines.118
The court in Chiapuzio deduced that Judge Bork did not
believe sexual harassment "fit comfortably" within the pur-
view of Title VII' 1 9 In Chiapuzio, the court interpreted
Judge Bork's dissent to mean that if the courts were to use
Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace,
then the courts would have to make "adjustments" in order to
justify the use of Title VII.120 Legal doctrines such as the
burden of proof for the plaintiff, as well as a different causa-
tion standard, were some of the adjustments that would be
required. 121 These adjustments made by each subsequent
court led to the conflicting treatment of same-gender sexual
harassment under Title VII.
D. Development of Case Law Prohibiting Same-Gender
Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII
The Joyner, Parrish, Wright, and Chiapuzio cases were
not the only federal cases to have addressed the issue of
same-gender sexual harassment. 122 Although, for the most
part, same-gender cases were allowed under Title VII, the
courts reached this conclusion without much discussion of Ti-
tle VII and its intended purpose.'
23
118. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1333 n.7 (Bork, J., dissenting).
119. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (D. Wyo.
1993).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Natl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178
(N.D. Ind. 1995); Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991); Goluszek v. Smith, 897 F.
Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988).
123. See Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *8-*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d
732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307,
309-10 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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The view of allowing same-gender sexual harassment
cases under Title VII was consistently followed until July
1994, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America.12 4 The
Garcia court resurrected the reasoning of the seemingly inef-
fectual case of Goluszek v. Smith.'25
1. Goluszek v. Smith
The 1988 case of Goluszek v. Smith 26 was one of the ear-
liest cases to find that sexual harassment of a male by a male
is not actionable under Title VII. 127 In Goluszek, the plaintiff
was an unmarried man who lived with his mother and
worked in a predominately male work environment.128 Fel-
low co-workers made remarks about the plaintiff's limited
sexual experiences and also teased him about being homosex-
ual. 1 29 The court held that the harassment by fellow male co-
workers did not create an anti-male environment in the
workplace and did not constitute actionable sexual harass-
ment under Title VII.130
The plaintiff was required to provide evidence that "but
for his sex, he would not have been the object of harass-
ment." 31 Because the plaintiff was a male who worked in a
predominately male environment, it was very difficult for him
to prove that he was subjected to an environment that
treated males as inferior.132
The court concluded that, although the plaintiff may
have been harassed because he was male, based on policy
considerations, this type of harassment was "not the type of
124. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
125. Soon after the court's decision in Goluszek, other jurisdictions refused to
follow its reasoning, instead allowing claims under Title VII for sexual harass-
ment between males. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *8-*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990).
126. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
127. See also Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,332 (6th Cir.
Jan. 15, 1992); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
128. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453-55.
129. Id. at 1453-54.
130. Id. at 1456.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1989).
132. Goluszek, 897 F. Supp. at 1456.
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conduct Congress intended to penalize when it enacted Title
VII.-133
Subsequent federal courts, in Parrish and Chiapuzio,'3
ignored the precedent set by Goluszek and allowed sexual
harassment claims between males under Title VII. 135
2. Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. was an
exception to the Parrish, Joyner, and Wright decisions.1
3 6
Although the Hannah court did not explicitly rely on Golus-
zek, it adopted the similar conclusion that the plaintiff, a het-
erosexual male working in a predominantly male environ-
ment, was not a member of a protected class.' 3 7 Therefore,
his claim was denied. 138 The incidents that were the basis for
the sexual harassment claim in Hannah included a supervi-
sor's kissing and hugging all employees regardless of their
sex.139 The claim also included one occasion where the plain-
tiff allegedly asked the harasser what he should do with the
last bottle of a display of Coca-Cola that he had been mer-
chandising, to which the supervisor replied, "Stick it up your
ass."
14 0
The court did not determine or discuss the applicability
of Title VII to same-gender sexual harassment. 14 1 Instead,
the court simply concluded that the plaintiff did not present
sufficient facts to satisfy a hostile work environment claim.1
42
The court found that "the plaintiff was a heterosexual male
employed in a heterosexual male environment," and the
plaintiff was not a member of a protected class for whom the
hostile environmental theory of recovery was reserved. 143
133. Id.
134. See discussion supra part II.C.
135. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *1 (N.D. IMI. Oct. 19, 1990).
136. 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
137. Hannah, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1328.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1327.
140. Id.
141. See generally Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
142. Id. at 1328.
143. Id.
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The court reasoned that employers must be protected
from "the 'hypersensitive' employee."'" In this particular
case, the court determined that the plaintiff must have been
overly sensitive to have felt that the isolated incidents of vul-
garity amounted to a hostile work environment. 145 The
Hannah court's decision was only the first in a line of cases
that would ignore other federal courts' treatment of same-
gender sexual harassment under Title VII, concluding that
such harassment did not fall under the dictates of Title
VII. 14 6
3. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America
In July 1994, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America.147 In this case, the
court stated unconditionally that "harassment by a male su-
pervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim
under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual over-
tones.' 48 Title VII addresses gender discrimination. 49
The plaintiff in Garcia complained on several occasions
that his supervisor "approached [him] from behind and
reached around and grabbed [his] crotch area and made sex-
ual motions from behind [him]." 150 The court determined
that the compensatory relief sought by Garcia was not avail-
able to him' 5 ' and thus dismissed his case. 152 The alleged
harassment took place prior to the enactment of the 1991
Civil Rights Act, which added punitive and compensatory re-
144. Id.
145. Applying the reasonable victim standard, the court in Hannah found
that the language used in the Coca Cola Bottle incident ("stick it up your ass")
was not sufficient to establish a hostile environment claim. Id. The court
stated that "one would be hypersensitive if he found the isolated use of vulgari-
ties constituted a hostile work environment." Id.
146. See supra part II.C.
147. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
148. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 311 (1994)). The Fifth Circuit's decision
in Giddens was not published and is not available from any electronic database
or other service. Id.
149. Id. at 451-52; accord Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D.
IIl. 1988).
150. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
151. Id. at 449-50. Prior to amendment in 1991, Title VII allowed only in-
junctive relief, which was often criticized as being inadequate in sexual harass-
ment cases. Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Har-
assment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1986).
152. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 450.
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lief to the available remedies under Title VII.153 Still, the
court discussed the fact that same-gender sexual harassment
is not actionable under Title VII. T'5
In formulating its decision in Garcia, the court relied on
Goluszek 155 and Giddens v. Shell Oil Co.156 By reviving the
earlier standard set in Goluszek, the court in Garcia estab-
lished a new direction for federal courts to follow when apply-
ing Title VII to exclusively male sexual harassment cases. 157
4. Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp.
Since the Fifth Circuit's decision in Garcia, two other
federal courts have addressed the same issue. In Vandeven-
ter v. Wabash National Corp.,158 the Indiana District Court
also followed the reasoning of Goluszek and Garcia and dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment under Ti-
tle VII, on the grounds that same-sex harassment was not
actionable under Title VII.'5 9 In Vandeventer, several de-
fendants made comments directed toward the plaintiff, in-
cluding calling him a "dick sucker" and wondering whether
plaintiff "could perform fellatio without his false teeth."1 60
The Vandeventer court agreed with the Goluszek analysis
that "Title VII is aimed at a gender-biased atmosphere; an
atmosphere of oppression by a 'dominant' gender. " 161 The
court found that the plaintiff was not subjected to an "anti-
male" environment. 162 Rather, the court felt that the defend-
ants simply "razzed" the plaintiff and found his "hot button
and pushed it" by calling him a homosexual. 6 3 Additionally,
the court stated, in dicta, that if the plaintiff felt he was in
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1995).
154. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 450-52.
155. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988); see supra part
II.D.1.
156. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 576 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 311 (1994).
157. See generally Garcia v. ELF Autochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir.
1994).
158. 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
159. Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 793.
160. Id. at 796.
161. Id.; accord Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. 111. 1988).
162. Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 796.
163. Id.
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fear of his safety, he had state law remedies available to
him. 164
Vandeventer not only reflected the federal courts' contin-
ued denial of protection undei Title VII to same-gender sex-
ual harassment, but it also offered alternative solutions,
based on tort law, for the victim. 165
5. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.
A recent case involving same-gender sexual harassment
was decided on December 28, 1994.166 In Hopkins v. Balti-
more Gas & Electric Co.,167 the court followed the reasoning
of the Fifth Circuit in Garcia, and that of the district courts
in Vandeventer and Goluszek. '6s The Hopkins court held that
Title VII "does not provide a cause of action for an employee
who claims to'have been the victim of sexual harassment by a
supervisor or co-worker of the same gender."169 The court
stated that the use of Title VII in same-gender sexual harass-
ment cases did not give effect to Congress' intent to "strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and wo-
men,"170 and that to apply Title VII to same-gender sexual
harassment would "strain" the language of the statute "be-
yond its manifest intent." 7'
Hopkins has added force to the federal courts' decisions
in Garcia and Vandeventer, which deny protection under Ti-
tle VII to all same-gender sexual harassment. The Garcia,
Vandeventer, and Hopkins cases are in direct conflict with the
Parrish, Joyner, Wright, and Chiapuzio courts, which grant
protection of same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Conflicting judicial decisions 172 leave the federal courts
with contradictory standards. If the federal courts follow
Parrish, Joyner, Wright, and Chiapuzio, then same-gender
164. Id. at 796 n.2.
165. Id.
166. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
aff'd, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 834.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834.
172. See discussion supra part II.C-D.
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sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. Sexual har-
assment under Title VII would include the bisexual harasser,
with perhaps the limiting instruction that in same-gender
sexual harassment cases, Title VII should apply only to sex-
ual harassment by a homosexual, and not against a
homosexual.
However, if the federal courts agree with the decisions in
Goluszek, Garcia, Vandeventer, and Hopkins, then no same-
gender sexual harassment is actionable, regardless of the
sexual orientation of the parties, the content of the harassing
conduct, or whether the harasser is identified as a bisexual
harasser. 173 As the court in Vandeventer stated, other state
law remedies are available to persons subjected to same-gen-
der sexual harassment. 1 74
In Hopkins, Garcia, Goluszek, and Vandeventer, the
courts did not examine what motivated the harassment of the
male plaintiffs, or whether any of the parties were homosexu-
als.'7 5 Rather, the courts removed all same-gender sexual
harassment from the class of prohibited conduct under Title
VII.' 76 Following Goluszek's lead, the courts based their deci-
sions on policy considerations, the goals of Title VII, and the
idea that same-gender sexual harassment is not by its nature
discriminatory. " 7
As discussed above, the legislative history of Title VII
does not by itself support the inclusion of sexual harassment
as prohibited conduct under the act.178 Nor could the framers
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have envisioned that the Act
would be used to address sexual abuses in the workplace; es-
pecially since the term sexual harassment was not even used
until the late 1970s. 1' Congress was enacting a civil rights
law meant to address the disadvantages and problems of in-
dividuals as a result of discrimination,18 0 and not a law that
173. See supra part II.D,
174. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat1 Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994),
reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
175. See discussion supra part II.D.
176. See discussion supra part II.D.
177. See discussion supra part II.D.
178. See supra part II.A.
179. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 27 n.13.
180. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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would prohibit any kind of harassing act that might offend
one person. 18
1
Because the court in Parrish accepted the rationale of
Joyner and Wright without much scrutiny or extensive dis-
cussion of the legislative history and purpose of Title VII,'8 2
the precedent of Joyner, Wright, and Parrish is precariously
weak.
IV. ANALYSIS
The motivation behind recognizing sexual harassment as
a form of discrimination under Title VII is that, commonly,
the harassment based on sex is a result of the struggle be-
tween those in power. This struggle has in the past been
mostly between men and women or other races that worked
for them.'8 3 Combined with this motivation is the additional
effect that a person who sexually harasses another inflicts an
injury on the entire gender by harassing an individual.'
Same-gender sexual harassment, however, does not re-
sult in the same type of injury as would occur between males
and females.' 85 The harassment is not a result of a power
struggle between members of the same gender.'8 6 Persons of
the same gender usually do not suffer from the same imbal-
ance of power that is present between males and females."'
A. The "Power" and "Group Injury" Principles of Sexual
Harassment Law
1. The Power Principle
Under Title VII, not all forms of harassment are actiona-
ble. Additionally, not all forms of verbal harassment with
sexual overtones are actionable. 88 Actionable sexual harass-
ment under Title VII "is the exploitation of a powerful posi-
181. See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted sub noma. PSFS Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815
(1985), aff'd sub. noin. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
182. See Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 19, 1990).
183. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 28; Schoenheider, supra note 151, at
1461.
184. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 172.
185. See Paul, supra note 60, at 352.
186. Id.
187. See infra part IV.A.
188. See discussion supra part II.A-B.
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tion to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling
but less powerful person."1 8 9 Sexual harassment fosters a
sense of degradation in the victim by attacking his or her sex-
uality.190 In effect, the offender is saying, by words or ac-
tions, that the victim is inferior because of the victim's mem-
bership in his or her gender group.' 91
The problem with relying on the "power" principle to jus-
tify viewing sexual harassment as sexual discrimination, is
that males, as well as females, can claim that they are vic-
tims of the stereotypical roles impressed upon them by a soci-
ety that has historically repressed women.192 According to
Professor Paul, in her article Sexual Harassment as Sex Dis-
crimination: A Defective Paradigm, men "are forced always to
maintain an aura of invincibility and machismo; to shoulder
responsibility for dependent women and children; to be en-
slaved to economic necessity for most of their adult lives; and
to die early for their efforts."1 93 Michael Douglas questioned
the validity and soundness of the paradigm when he asked in
the recent movie Disclosure, 94 if "sexual harassment is about
power, when did I ever have the power?"'95
2. Sexual Harassment as a "Group Injury"
In addition to the power struggle analysis, early support-
ers of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII were motivated by the notion that sexual har-
assment is a "group injury." 96
Professor Paul uses two examples to demonstrate the dif-
ference between sexual harassment used as a form of dis-
189. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
aff'd, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996).
190. See Schoenheider, supra note 151, at 1464-65.
191. Paul, supra note 60, at 349; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (discussing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
192. Paul, supra note 60, at 348.
193. Id. Professor Paul is making a generalization about male characteriza-
tions. It is arguable that homosexual men do not fit into this mold. Since sex-
ual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII, this generalization of
males is more appropriate to Title VII analysis.
194. DISCLOSURE (Warner Bros. 1995). Disclosure is a movie based on
Michael Crichton's book about a man who is sexually harassed by his female
boss. Id.
195. Id.
196. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 172; Paul, supra note 60, at 349.
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crimination of a group, and harassment targeted toward an
individual. 197
[In the first situation, a] supervisor demands sexual fa-
vors in return for job benefits because of [his] sexual de-
sire, and he selects his target because he finds her sexu-
ally attractive . . . . [In the second situation,] the
supervisor refuses to hire, to promote, or to reward a fe-
male employee as he would a comparable male, because
he has an animus of some sort against women.
198
The difference between the two situations is that in the
former, the supervisor does not harass the female because
she is a woman, but rather, because she is beautiful. In the
latter example, the woman is discriminated against because
she is a member of a certain group, regardless of her individ-
ual qualities. Professor Paul also uses examples to demon-
strate how discrimination has historically been motivated by
inflicting injury on individuals because of their membership
in a group.' 99 Professor Paul states that "Nazis despised all
Jews, not just those with certain attributes; South African
apartheid [was] directed at all Blacks, not just those with cer-
tain features; Jim Crow laws were aimed at all Blacks."2 0 0
The recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination was motivated by the understanding that sex-
ual harassment was a way to perpetuate the power struggle
between genders, and by the view that sexual harassment as
inflicted on a member of a group was an insult and injury to
all members of that gender.20 '
B. Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Is Not Discriminatory
1. Defining Discriminatory Behavior
When, in Meritor, the Supreme Court first endorsed a
sexual harassment and hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion under Title VII, it stated, "Title VII affords employees
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."20 2 In Harris v. Forklift
197. Paul, supra note 60, at 349-50.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 350.
201. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
202. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (emphasis added).
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Systems, Inc.,2°3 the Supreme Court consistently referred to a
"discriminatorily" abusive or hostile environment. Therefore,
to establish a cause of action of sexual harassment under Ti-
tle VII, the work environment must not only be hostile, but it
must be hostile on a discriminatory basis.
Although it is difficult to define exactly what constitutes
discrimination, the classic understanding is that discrimina-
tion against a member of the group necessarily attaches the
same scorn or negative stereotype to all members of the
20group. 04 If one adheres to the "group injury" theory of dis-
crimination, then discrimination can be defined as "harming
someone or denying someone a benefit because that person is
a member of a group that the discriminator despises."20 5
2. Discriminatory Behavior and Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment
With the above definition, same-gender sexual harass-
ment cannot, by its nature, be considered sex discrimination
under Title VII. 20 6 In a situation where the harasser and the
victim are of the same sex, the harasser is not trying to ridi-
cule or scorn the victim because he is male.20 v Rather, the
harasser is really
preferring or selecting one member of his own gender for
attention, however unwelcome that attention may be to
the other person. The harasser most likely does not de-
spise or want to adversely affect the entire group [gender],
nor does he wish to harm its members, since he himself is
a member.208
Most Title VII cases involve inter-group discrimina-
tion.20 9 The one exception has been the willingness of the
courts to recognize harassment by a homosexual against a
heterosexual member of the same sex.210
203. 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
204. See Paul, supra note 60, at 350.
205. Id. at 352.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 n.1 (D.
Wyo. 1993) (quoting Paul, supra note 60, at 351-52).
209. Paul, supra note 60, at 352.
210. E.g., Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1334; Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins.
Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd
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However, taking into consideration the "power" and
"group injury" theories behind sexual harassment, all same-
gender sexual harassment by its nature cannot be a form of
sex discrimination.2 11 Men do not have comparable power
over other men as they historically have had over women.212
Although it can be argued that there exists a power struggle
between members of the same sex, the motivation and rea-
sons behind that power struggle are generally not the same
as those between the sexes. When a male uses his position of
power to intimidate another male, he does so not because the
employee is male, but because he is in control. However, in
the situation where a male asserts his authority to ridicule a
female, he is more likely motivated by the fact that she is a
woman rather than because she is a subordinate worker.
Furthermore, it does not logically follow that a member
of the same gender would, through his harassing conduct of
another man, intend to injure or degrade the entire male gen-
der group of which he is a member.2 13
Harassment by a member of the same sex does not have
the same effect as the harassment by a male of a female, or
vice versa.21 4 In recent years, studies have shown that there
is an increased incidence of conduct in the workplace that wo-
men find to be sexually harassing. 215 These studies also sug-
gest that what women often find to be offensive is not simi-
larly perceived by men.216 In fact, many of the men found the
conduct or comments to be "harmless and innocent."21 7 How-
ever, when the harassment is inflicted on a person of the
without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth
Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
211. Paul, supra note 60, at 352; Note, supra note 56, at 1451-52.
212. See BABCOCK, supra note 58, at 195-99.
213. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 n.1 (D.
Wyo. 1993) (quoting Paul, supra note 60, at 351-52).
214. But cf Note, supra note 56, at 1451-52. The problems that women have
had with bringing sexual harassment cases is that often their male harassers
do not understand that their conduct is offensive to women. Id. This difference
in understanding between males and females "indicates a lack of social consen-
sus on appropriate standards of behavior." Id. This lack of understanding by
males tends to support the proposition that males have a similar perception
from which they view the world. Id. This proposition, of course, does not take
into account ethnic or racial norms which may affect one's understanding of
appropriate behavior, which is beyond the scope of this comment.
215. Id. at 1451 n.9.
216. Id. at 1451 & n.10.
217. Id. at 1451 nn.10-11.
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same gender, the perspectives can be the same.218 The effect
of sexual harassment is dependent on an individual's sensi-
tivity level.2 19
A logical analogy is to compare the distinction between
homosexual pornography and traditional heterosexual por-
nography. In homosexual pornography, both participants are
male. To the extent there is any objectification or violence
depicted, both the perpetrator and the victim are male.
There is no "other" against whom these degradations are
committed. Conversely, in traditional male-centered hetero-
sexual pornography, women are routinely shown in degrad-
ing and subservient positions. There is a distinct dominant
class, men, and a subjugated class, women.22 °
3. Application of the Reasonable Victim Standard
Courts often use the "reasonable victim" standard to de-
termine whether there is actionable sexual harassment.2 21
The reasonable victim standard is defined as a reasonable
person of the same gender as the victim. 222 Additionally, in
order to establish a prima facie case for sexual harassment
under Title VII, the harassment must be "sufficiently severe
and pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment."223 Courts have stated that employers should be pro-
tected against the "hypersensitive employee." 224
Under the above standards and conditions, a claim of
harassment by a person of the same gender would be hard to
prove because of the difficulty in ascertaining what conduct a
reasonable man would tolerate. The necessary inquiry would
218. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
219. Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991).
220. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-
Suppression, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1137 nn. 174-75 (1974).
221. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987)
(using reasonable woman standard for female victims and a reasonable man
standard for male victims); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (using reasonable person of the victim's sex).
222. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
223. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
224. Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991).
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be whether a reasonable man - not a reasonable homosex-
ual man - would find the work environment to be hostile.
One of the dangers of the reasonable victim standard is
that it is more likely that the more dominant in the group -
namely, white, affluent, heterosexual males - will be con-
strued as representative of the whole group. 225 A jury
composed of men and women would probably find it very diffi-
cult to decide that a male subjected to sexual jokes or teasing
from another male had to endure a work environment that
was sufficiently pervasive as to create a hostile work
environment.226
Same-gender sexual harassment is not an injury to a
group, but rather is focused on the individual victim. On the
other hand, an argument often used against imposing liabil-
ity for male-female sexual harassment is that the harasser is
not intentionally trying to hurt the victim by his words or ac-
tions, but he does not realize he is offending her.227 Because
he lacks the same perspective as the female, he does not un-
derstand how the victim feels about being harassed with sex-
ual innuendoes.228 However, when the harasser and the vic-
tim are of the same gender, they must know how the words
will affect their victim because they have, at least, a similar
perspective.229
4. Sexual Conduct in the Workplace
Research and literature support the above assertion that
there are differences in the way sexual conduct in the work-
place is perceived by men and women.230 Kathryn Abrams
argues that men consider sexual comments and conduct as
comparatively harmless amusement."23 ' When sexual com-
ments or conduct are directed toward them, men are more
apt to find it harmless and even flattering, but they are un-
225. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 9, at 50-51. Chamallas critiques the use of
the reasonable woman standard in male on female sexual harassment. Id. The
analysis in that situation is analogous to the use of the reasonable man stan-
dard in same-gender sexual harassment cases.
226. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
227. See Note, supra note 56, at 1451.
228. See supra part II.B.
229. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989).
230. BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-54 (1985).
231. Abrams, supra note 229, at 1203.
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likely to consider it insulting or intimidating.23 2 Abrams re-
fers mainly to harassment between a man and a woman, but
she notes that her conclusions "might be different if a man
were harassed by a gay male employer or supervisor."2 "3 But
as discussed below,234 the treatment by the court of harass-
ment of a heterosexual male by a homosexual has been found
to be prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII.23 5 How-
ever, if the stigma of being harassed by a homosexual did not
exist, then a heterosexual male subjected to sexual jokes or
innuendoes from another heterosexual male would not feel as
threatened. Furthermore, such same-gender harassment is
not a form of discrimination and should not be actionable
under Title VII. 236
Same-gender sexual harassment, whether perpetuated
by or against a homosexual, is not sufficient to indicate a dis-
criminatory work environment hostile to men. That an other-
wise reasonable man would be highly offended by homosexual
jokes or pictures is not enough. This man must reasonably
feel that the homosexual depictions strike at his gender as a
class, or at him personally because of his gender. Still, there
is no clear interpretation of what same-gender sexual harass-
ment means. Does a homosexual harass another man be-
cause he is a male, or because the harasser is a homosexual?
How does the victim perceive the harassment? Does he feel
threatened and ridiculed because he is a heterosexual being
harassed by a homosexual or because he is man? There are
no clear answers to these questions, and the courts do not
offer any solutions to these interpretive problems. Rather,
the courts confuse the issues by varying their treatment of
same-gender sexual harassment under Title VII.
232. Id. at 1206.
233. Id.
234. See infra part IV.C.
235. E.g., Parrish v. Washington Nat1 Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *8-*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d
732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307,
310 (N.D. 111. 1981).
236. See discussion supra part 1V.B.
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C. Disparate Treatment of Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment and Sexual Orientation Harassment
In Garcia, Hopkins, and Vandeventer, the courts articu-
lated a general standard that same-gender sexual harass-
ment is not actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. 23 7
The facts of these cases, discussed above,238 included a mix-
ture of heterosexual conduct and other actions which the vic-
tims perceived as being homosexual.23 9 Prior to the ruling in
Garcia, courts distinguished between harassment by a homo-
sexual, which is covered under Title VII, and harassment of a
homosexual, which is not.240 Both the Garcia and Hopkins
courts, while denying relief under Title VII to victims of
same-gender harassment, did not address the prior inconsis-
tent treatment of harassment by and against homosexuals in
the federal courts. Rather, the Garcia, Hopkins, and Vande-
venter courts concluded that Title VII does not cover same-
gender sexual harassment, does not differentiate between the
two situations, and denies relief under Title VII to all same-
gender sexual harassment cases, even those of heterosexual
males who are harassed by homosexual males.241
This conflict leaves the federal courts with an interesting
dilemma. If the courts follow Garcia, Vandeventer, and Hop-
kins, then heterosexual males harassed by homosexual males
because of their sex will not be protected, even though the
circumstances are similar to when a female is harassed by a
male.242 However, a female who is repeatedly harassed by a
male because she is an attractive woman, would have a Title
VII claim.243
237. Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F. Supp. 1178(N.D. Ind. 1995); Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991); Goluszek v. Smith, 897 F.
Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
238. See discussion supra part II.D. 1-5.
239. See discussion supra part II.D.1-5.
240. See discussion supra part II.C.
241. See discussion supra part II.D.
242. See supra part IV.C. A heterosexual male harassed by a homosexual
male because he is desired sexually, is the general equivalent to when a female
is harassed by a male, or vice versa.
243. E.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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The Parrish, Joyner, and Wright courts would argue that
a male who is repeatedly harassed by another male because
he is good looking and sexually desirable would also have a
claim under Title VII.244 In the same-gender harassment ex-
ample above, the harasser is most likely a homosexual, since
he has sexual desires for another man. Adhering to the stan-
dard of Parrish, Joyner, and Wright, a court faced with such a
situation would likely find that the heterosexual male was
harassed because of his sex. Similar to the situation where
the female is harassed because she is sexually desired by her
male harasser, so is the male who is harassed by the homo-
sexual. However, if the courts follow Parrish, Joyner, and
Wright, then only some males are protected.245
In Parrish, the male plaintiff alleged that his male super-
visor brushed up against his thighs and buttocks.246 In dicta,
the court stated that unwelcome homosexual advances are
actionable under Title VII, unlike harassment of homosexu-
als.247 However, as the court in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Co. stated, harassment of a homosexual is not
based on gender but rather is based on sexual preference,
which is not one of the forbidden categories in Title VII.2 4 1
On the other hand, harassment by a homosexual is based on
gender because the harasser prefers the victim's gender, and
if the employee is not of the preferred gender, he would not
have inspired the harassing treatment by the homosexual. 2
49
Another example of a federal court decision that harass-
ment based on sexual preference or orientation is not actiona-
ble is Carreno v. Local Union No. 226.250 In Carreno, the
court rejected a Title VII claim for harassment based on the
plaintiff's homosexuality because the harassment was moti-
244. See supra part IV.B.
245. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597
F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732 (11th
Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D.
IMI. 1981).
246. Parrish, 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13934, at *3.
247. Id. at *9 n.2.
248. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
249. Megan P. Norris & Mark A. Randon, Sexual Orientation and the Work-
place: Recent Developments in Discrimination and Harassment Law, 19 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 233, 237-38 (1993).
250. 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990).
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vated by the fact that the plaintiff was a homosexual, not be-
cause he was male.
In Dillon v. Frank,25 1 the Sixth Circuit also examined the
legislative intent of Congress in enacting Title V11 252 and the
plain meaning of the language of the statute. 253 The court
concluded that a traditional interpretation of the word "sex"
as meaning gender was intended.2 54 "Sex" was added to the
legislation along with other "immutable characteristics,"255
like race, color, and national origin, or "almost immutable
characteristics such as religion."256
D. Comparison of the Bisexual Harasser and the Same-
Gender Harasser
A bisexual harasser is one who harasses both males and
females to the same extent.257 For several years, numerous
courts of appeal have recognized, in dicta, that the sexual
harassment of an employee of either gender by a bisexual
harasser would fall outside the scope of Title VII. 258 How-
ever, with the decision in Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp. ,259 harassment by a bisexual harasser would be covered
and thus prohibited by Title VII.260 In Chiapuzio, the court
reasoned that "[t]he equal harassment of both genders does
not escape the purview of Title VII."261
In Chiapuzio, the supervisor, through his comments to
the men,262 intended to demean and humiliate them because
they were males. 263 The court concluded, therefore, that the
nature of the supervisor's conduct indicated that he harassed
251. 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
252. See supra part II.A.
253. See supra part II.A.
254. Dillon, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 41,332.
255. Norris & Randon, supra note 249, at 239.
256. Id.
257. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Wyo.
1993).
258. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Hensen v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
259. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
260. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337.
261. Id.
262. The defendant made comments to plaintiffs regarding their inability to
sexually please their wives. Id.
263. Id.
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the males because of their gender, and such conduct was ac-
tionable under Title VII.264
But one should question whether the court allowed this
claim because it was filed in conjunction with the traditional
female/male sexual harassment, or whether the court was
propounding that anytime there is same-gender sexual har-
assment, regardless of the circumstances, it is actionable
under Title VII. The court does seem to suggest that a bisex-
ual harasser is insulated from liability by either females or
males simply because both are harassed,26 5 but the court
does not discuss whether the same-gender sexual harassment
is by itself discriminatory.26 6 The court seemed to treat the
same-gender harassment by the bisexual harasser as contem-
poraneous with the more traditional harassment by the male
of a female.267 The federal courts' treatment of the same-gen-
der harassment as such leaves open the question whether
same-gender harassment by itself is discrimination. Is it
simply an individual injury which would be better dealt with
under a tort theory, rather than under Title VII?
V. PROPOSAL
A. Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Should Not Be
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII
According to Chiapuzio, Parrish, Joyner, and Wright, if
the victim is a heterosexual, then he is protected by Title VII,
and if the victim is a homosexual, then he is not protected. 268
Federal courts, however, should follow the lead of Garcia,
Vandeventer, and Hopkins, and deny relief for all same-gen-
der sexual harassment under Title VII. 269 According to the
courts in Garcia, Vandeventer, and Hopkins, same-gender
264. Id. at 1338.
265. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1338.
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1334; Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934, at *1, *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion,
749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. IlM. 1981).
269. Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wa-
bash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F.
Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 56
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sexual harassment is not actionable as sexual discrimination
under Title VII.2 70 Such harassment is not the type of con-
duct that sexual harassment law was meant to deter. A clear
standard, such as the one proposed by the Garcia line of
cases, would eliminate the inconsistent decisions resulting
from situations when either the victim or the harasser is ho-
mosexual or a perceived homosexual.
Federal courts have repeatedly maintained that sexual
preference is not protected under Title VII. 271 Ironically, the
Parrish line of cases allow such claims. These courts apply
Title VII to claims where a man is harassed by a homosexual.
When a homosexual male harasses a heterosexual male, the
harassment is assumed to be motivated by the harasser's sex-
ual preference for men. In this scenario, the victim feels
harassed because he himself is a heterosexual. Allowing him
protection from harassment by a homosexual under Title VII
is inherently an issue of sexual orientation. However, here
the sexual preference is heterosexual rather than
homosexual.272
If federal courts were to question the sexual orientation
of persons involved in a Title VII sexual harassment case, the
issues could become even more confusing. If courts find that
one man harassing another man is a function of homosexual-
ity, then logically an argument can be made that a man sexu-
ally harassing a female is a function of his heterosexuality.
This would make all sexual harassment discrimination
claims an issue of sexual preference, and not hostile work
environments.
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991); Goluszek v. Smith,
697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
270. Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 70
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); Vandeventer v. Wa-
bash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994), reconsidered, 887 F.
Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
271. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan.
15, 1992); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); De Cintio v. Westchester County Medical
Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017
(1985); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
272. "Sexual orientation" means male or female homosexuality, heterosexu-
ality, and bisexuality, by preference or practice. Gay Rights Coalition v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 2 n.1 (D.C. 1987).
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Also, considering the "power" principle, both females and
homosexuals have historically been in positions of less
power."' Yet, if the Parrish line of cases is followed, the his-
torically powerless homosexual who is harassed by the heter-
osexual male, the historically powerful one, has no recourse
under Title VII. However, in the contrary situation, where
the harasser is the homosexual, the heterosexual male would
be protected under Title VII. 274 This result is entirely antag-
onistic to the "power" principles behind the creation of sexual
harassment law.275
Sexual harassment between two males is sufficiently dif-
ferent than harassment between the sexes to deny it protec-
tion under Title VII. This is not to say that victims of same-
gender sexual harassment are not hurt or injured by this be-
havior. Rather, Title VII is not the appropriate remedy. Title
VII was enacted to prohibit sex discrimination. The fact that
the courts have continuously failed to recognize that harass-
ment of a homosexual is not discrimination, and that harass-
ment by a homosexual of a heterosexual is protected, is evi-
dence of the courts' reluctance to regulate all harassing
behavior in the workplace. The federal courts must articu-
late a consistent standard to apply to workplace harassment.
B. Victims of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Have
Other Available Remedies
1. Tort Remedies
Even if Hopkins, Garcia, and Vandeventer become the
standard throughout the country, victims of same-gender sex-
ual harassment will not be left without a judicial remedy.
Several states have separate statutes prohibiting sexual har-
assment in the workplace with standards more lenient than
those imposed by Title VII.2 76 Victims of sexual harassment
can sue their harasser under a tort theory of liability, such as
273. See MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 174-75.
274. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13934, at *1, *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1990); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp.,
597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 749 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-
10 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
275. See supra part IV.A.1.
276. E.g., Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding that "based on sex" protects all sexes, regardless of sexual
orientation).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. The employer
could also be sued under a theory of respondeat superior, if
the employer knew of the harassment and did not take rea-
sonable measures to deter the injurious situation.
Although this proposition is not entirely novel,277 its lim-
ited application to situations involving same-gender sexual
harassment is new. Previous suggestions of creating a sepa-
rate sexual harassment tort cause of action applied to all sex-
ual harassment, not just those involving parties of the same
gender.278 Professor Paul, in her article Sexual Harassment
as Sexual Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, argues,
the subsumption of sexual harassment under Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination in employment has no basis in
either the language or the legislative history of Title VII,
generates numerous doctrinal difficulties and anomalies,
and should be reconsidered and rejected in favor of a new
common law tort of sexual harassment.279
Another commentator 28 suggests treating sexual har-
assment as a tort rather than discrimination under Title VII,
because Title VII remedies are "grossly inadequate"2 1 to di-
minish the detrimental effect on women's economic opportu-
nities and physical and emotional well-being.28 2 However,
this suggestion to treat all sexual harassment as a tort was
made prior to the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which
added compensatory and punitive damages as remedies
available under Title VII.283 Therefore, the concerns of this
commentator are cured by the passage of the 1991
Amendment.
Many commentators have opposed applying tort reme-
dies to sexual harassment "because they consider the prob-
lem societal - not personal."28 4 Another argument against
sexual harassment as a tort is that under tort law, sexual
harassment would only be viewed as an injury to an individ-
277. Treating sexual harassment as a tort has been suggested by two differ-
ent authors. See Paul, supra note 60; see also Schoenheider, supra note 151.
278. Paul, supra note 60, at 359; Schoenheider, supra note 151.
279. Paul, supra note 60, at 359.
280. Schoenheider, supra note 151, at 1462.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (1992).
284. Paul, supra note 60, at 360.
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ual's dignity.285 Sexual harassment as a tort would ignore
the "group injury" aspect of sexual harassment.28 6
The negative resistance to allowing a separate sexual
harassment tort cause of action for all sexual harassment
rather than an action under Title VII, would not be a problem
if the remedy applied only to same-gender sexual harass-
ment. The arguments against sexual harassment as a tort do
not apply to same-gender sexual harassment. Same-gender
sexual harassment is not an injury to a group, but rather is
focused on the individual victim. 287 Moreover, sexual harass-
ment is often perpetuated by a co-worker, but under Title
VII, compensatory relief is unavailable for co-worker harass-
ment.28 Thus, the individual's rights would be better served
by tort compensatory remedies, than by Title VII's
remedies.289
Title VII provides that where conduct of an employer is
discriminatory, the court may order action "which may in-
clude, but is not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay,... or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate."29 ° Compensatory and puni-
tive damages are not available under Title VII for conduct
occurring before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.291
Likewise, if an employee does prevail in a Title VII law-
suit, fellow employees, or even the employer, may be hostile
to the plaintiff, and relations may become so strained that an
injunction or reinstatement under Title VII would not be
preferable.292
285. Id.
286. See supra part IV.A.2.
287. See supra part IV.
288. See Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Young, Note, Employer Liability
for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 85 (1984-1985).
289. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g) (1992).
290. Id.
291. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992),
aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
292. Suzanne E. Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual
Harassment, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 119 (1983).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Victims of repeated sexual harassment often suffer from
emotional distress as well as physical problems.293 The tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a perfect
model for a potential cause of action for sexual harassment.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as follows: "One who
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject
to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to
the other results from it, for such bodily harm."294 According
to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "mere in-
sults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression or
other trivialities will not be sufficient to cause liability. "295
For the victim of same-gender sexual harassment, this
theory of recovery provides a particularly strong chance for
recovery of monetary rewards. The fact that the tort is de-
fined in terms of the actor's conduct almost assures an award
for punitive damages. Punitive damages are also a vital de-
terrent to harassing in the first place. This cause of action
would sufficiently protect would-be harassers from the overly
sensitive person, as well as provide adequate compensation
for those who truly are emotionally damaged by the sexual
harassment, even though the standards for a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress are difficult to
establish.
Already, most Title VII sexual harassment cases are
often combined with state tort causes of action.296 If same-
gender sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII,
then a whole class of cases will be removed from federal court
jurisdiction. This result would provide better judicial econ-
omy in the federal system, and it would allow the state courts
to decide the appropriate state law tort action.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Professor Paul stated in her article, "[t]he law is sup-
posed to look to acts whether criminal or tortuous,[sic] to de-
293. Schoenheider, supra note 151, at 1464-65.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
295. Id. cmt. a.
296. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 (6th Cir. Jan.
15, 1992).
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termine culpability and not to the individual characteristics
of the perpetrators, that is precisely what is meant by the
rule of law."297 If federal courts follow the reasoning in
Chiapuzio, Parrish, Joyner, and Wright, and treat same-gen-
der sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII depend-
ing on whether the harasser is a homosexual or heterosexual,
the whole rule of law in this area would be undermined. Case
decisions would continue to be inconsistent. Decisions would
depend on the individual judge's interpretation of the facts.
What one court could consider harassment based on homo-
sexual behavior, such as a kiss on a cheek, another court
could decide the opposite.
However, if the federal courts follow Garcia, Vandeven-
ter, and Hopkins, and find that all same-gender sexual har-
assment is not actionable under Title VII, then the courts
would have a clear standard to follow. This clear standard
would provide courts with a definite guideline to follow when
dealing with same-gender sexual harassment cases. This
standard is justified because of the unique, individual effects
of same-gender sexual harassment. The treatment of such
conduct as discrimination under Title VII is not appropriate
given the original intentions of recognizing sexual harass-
ment as a form of sex discrimination.298
Although same-gender sexual harassment would not be
actionable under Title VII, a man who is harassed at work by
another man would not be left without a legal remedy. He
could complain to his employer and try to rectify the situa-
tion, or he could bring a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.299
A line must be drawn between judicial treatment of sex-
ual orientation sexual harassment and same-gender sexual
harassment if the courts are to apply Title VII consistently.
There are any number of situations of sexually harassing be-
havior that can be imagined involving various combinations
of gender and sexual orientations. Although this comment fo-
cuses mainly on male to male, or homosexual male and heter-
osexual male sexual harassment, many other combinations
297. Paul, supra note 60, at 351.
298. See supra part IV.
299. See supra part V.
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are possible. 0 0 It is not the job of the courts to referee work-
place behavior. The courts should focus their attention, when
applying Title VII, to types of sexual harassment that ad-
vance the purposes of Title VII to eliminate invidious dis-
crimination in the workplace. The function of the court is not
to teach manners, but to apply the law.
Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse*
300. Other examples include harassment of a lesbian by a heterosexual fe-
male, a homosexual harassing another homosexual, or a female harassing an-
other female.
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